Profile: high risk and full OpSec

The heaviest base profile. You operate in an environment where a mistake can have serious legal, physical or personal consequences. Full OpSec required.

Profile: high risk and full OpSec

Profile: high risk and full OpSec

Who this profile is for

This profile is for people whose risk is not theoretical: people living under authoritarian governments, whistleblowers exposing state secrets, people who are being seriously threatened or surveilled, or anyone in an active legal conflict where digital evidence plays a role. It fits readers who may face:

  • targeted surveillance by a state, employer, or organised adversary
  • serious legal, physical, or personal consequences after one digital mistake
  • a real need for compartmentalisation across identities, devices, and contacts

This is not a beginner article. The previous profiles are the foundation. This article builds on them.

Honesty first: No system is perfect. OpSec is a practice, not a destination. The question is not “am I 100% safe?” — that question has no answer. The question is: “am I making it expensive enough for my adversary?”

Use this only as your base profile when your situation genuinely requires compartmentalisation, minimal footprint and protection against advanced targeted adversaries.

Do not use this profile as an escalation path because you want to be “even more privacy-friendly.” This is for situations where the extra friction, isolation and social consequences are genuinely justified by the risk.


The difference from lower risk

At lower risk levels, it’s about protection against automated, mass threats. At high risk, it’s about targeted, sophisticated attacks — an adversary who is specifically looking for you and has resources to invest in that.

That changes the model fundamentally:

  • One weak link is enough to undermine the entire system
  • Metadata is just as dangerous as content
  • Physical security is just as important as digital security
  • Social engineering (manipulating people) is more effective than technical attacks

What you gain, and what it costs

If you apply this profile seriously, you typically gain:

  • less chance that one device, account or mistake exposes all your activities at once
  • better separation between identities, contacts and tasks
  • more control over metadata, source protection and device seizure risk
  • more resilience if one component does get compromised

But it costs something:

  • significantly more friction in daily use
  • multiple devices, identities or workflows you must consistently maintain
  • less spontaneity, because actions that are normal for others can create risk here

For this profile that is usually a reasonable trade. If you cannot sustain this discipline, a smaller but consistent setup is safer than a “perfect” system you only half use.


Core principles of full OpSec

1. Compartmentalisation Every activity, identity, and device is separated. Your anonymous account must never be traceable back to your real name — not via an IP address, not via writing style, not via a shared contact.

2. Threat modelling Know exactly who your adversary is, what they want, and what they’re capable of. A state actor with access to NSO Group tools is different from an angry ex-partner. Your security adapts accordingly.

3. Minimal footprint Share as little information as possible. This applies to digital traces but also to what you tell whom.

4. Trust nothing blindly No platform, no tool, no person is automatically trusted. Trust is something that is earned and verified.


Devices and infrastructure

Phone

  • GrapheneOS — no equivalent alternative at this threat level. See the hardening guide for full configuration. (Currently on iPhone and can’t switch? At minimum turn on Lockdown Mode (Settings → Privacy & Security → Lockdown Mode → Turn On Lockdown Mode; see the guide). Apple built it for people who may be targeted by mercenary spyware such as Pegasus: it strictly limits apps, websites and features to shrink the attack surface, but it is no guarantee. See also iPhone privacy settings. Switch to GrapheneOS as soon as that becomes possible.)
  • Auto reboot (Settings → Security & privacy → Exploit protection → Auto reboot) at the default 18 hours or shorter: a locked phone that isn’t unlocked in time restarts and returns to BFU (Before First Unlock), with your data at rest
  • USB-C port on the same screen set to Off if you charge wirelessly (Off also blocks wired charging while the phone is on; the default already blocks new USB connections while the phone is locked)
  • No SIM card for anonymous activities — use wifi-only with Tor or VPN
  • Know the duress PIN (GrapheneOS: entering it wherever the phone asks for your PIN or password irreversibly wipes the device, installed eSIMs included)
  • Physical camera cover: the Camera access toggle is a software switch in the OS (Pixels have no hardware camera switch)

For anonymous activities: a separate phone, bought with cash, activated over wifi without your real identity.

That does not mean everyone in this profile immediately needs three phones. Start with one well-hardened device and only add separate devices when identities or risks genuinely need to be kept apart.

Laptop

  • Tails for anonymous tasks — boots from USB and leaves no trace on the computer once shut down. See tails.net and the Tails OS review
  • Compartmentalisation guide — when Qubes OS and Whonix are the right step, how to choose and how to start. See also the Qubes OS review and Whonix review for product details.
  • Full-disk encryption goes without saying (LUKS on Linux)
  • BIOS password + Secure Boot
  • Laptop physically secured: don’t use the built-in webcam (cover it), disable microphone at OS level

Choose deliberately here — not everything at once:

  • use Tails for tasks that genuinely must leave no local traces
  • use Qubes OS only if you can operationally manage that compartmentation
  • don’t keep a regular laptop half-converted in a limbo state you no longer trust

Network

  • Tor for anonymous communication — not for streaming or heavy use, but for sensitive matters it has no substitute
  • VPN comparison — Mullvad is often the practical daily-use outcome, with only a random account number (no email address) and payment via cash or Monero. Not a Tor replacement, but a layer.
  • Never on public wifi for sensitive activities without VPN + Tor
  • At home: separate router for sensitive activities, or use a GL.iNet with OpenWrt and strict DNS

A VPN does not replace Tor, and Tor does not replace good compartmentalisation. Network layers only help if your device, account and behaviour layers are also right.


Communication

Messaging

Signal setup guide as the primary messaging route for known contacts. Molly, the more privacy-hardened Signal variant with database encryption independent of phone lock, is on hold for new users since 19 October 2026 because its updates are months behind Signal; use Signal for now:

  • Disappearing messages set to 24 hours or less by default
  • Verify safety numbers with every contact

For contacts without Signal: Matrix via Element with a private server, or PGP email.

Never: WhatsApp, Telegram (default), SMS for anything sensitive.

Choose communication by task:

  • Signal for known contacts where reliability and practical security still matter
  • SimpleX or Session when identifier-free or more strongly isolated contact is genuinely needed; Briar when contact has to keep working without internet (it is not anonymous to your contacts: they receive your device’s Bluetooth and local network addresses)
  • SecureDrop for anonymous submissions and source contact in journalistic contexts
  • PGP email only where email genuinely must remain, not as a general chat substitute

Email

Use email in this profile only for what genuinely has to remain email. Start with choosing secure email without overkill to decide whether you need a provider choice, a portal route, or a heavier PGP workflow here.

For sensitive email outside Proton-to-Proton traffic, PGP is often necessary. See the PGP guide.

As a provider, Proton Mail is usually the most practical privacy-friendly route — see choosing secure email without overkill for the decision and the Proton Mail review for product details. Posteo is a more minimal alternative without tracking. Self-hosting gives more control, but it also requires more expertise and operational discipline.

Remember: email metadata (who sends to whom, when) is always visible to the provider. PGP encrypts the content, not the envelope.

Anonymous communication

For source contact or anonymous information exchange:

  • SecureDrop — built specifically for anonymous source contact with journalists
  • SimpleX Chat — no identifier, no account; its relay servers keep no user register or contact graph, but they still see network traffic (use Tor to hide your IP address)
  • Briar — peer-to-peer via Tor, no server, also works without internet (Bluetooth/wifi); not anonymous to your contacts, who receive your device’s Bluetooth and local network addresses; in maintenance mode since July 2026, so security fixes only (see the guide)
  • Session — no phone number required, onion routing, decentralised; small team after a 2026 funding crisis (see the guide)

Stripping metadata

Most files you share carry metadata: creation time, author or username, GPS coordinates (in photos), software version. The metadata removal guide covers Word, PDF and photos step by step.

Required for every file you share:

LibreOffice (Writer, Calc, Impress): Tools → Options → LibreOffice → Security → Options… → tick Remove personal information on saving and leave the “Keep …” boxes below it unticked → OK (on a Mac: LibreOffice → Preferences instead of Tools → Options). From the next save, author names in comments and tracked changes become “Author1”, “Author2” and so on, time values are reset to one standard value and user data is dropped from the file properties, so save the file again after turning it on. For a single document: File → Properties → General, untick Apply user data and click Reset Properties (resets editing time, creation date and version number, and deletes the modification and print dates).

Word (Windows; Word for Mac has none): use the Document Inspector; the steps are in the metadata removal guide.

Photos, PDFs and other files on Linux: Metadata Cleaner (Flathub: io.gitlab.metadatacleaner.metadatacleaner, version 4.0.0; the original app is archived, this is the maintained fork). Click Open Files… or drag the files into the window, then click Clean and confirm with Clean. It cleans the files themselves, not a copy, and its own warning says this is irreversible, so work on copies. It uses MAT2 underneath: by default PDF pages are turned into images, so text can no longer be selected; the lightweight mode in its settings keeps the text but removes less.

On your phone: on Android, Scrambled Exif or Metadata Remover via F-Droid, but those only handle images, not documents (Metadata Remover’s latest F-Droid release dates from April 2024). iPhone: see the metadata removal guide.

Always check afterwards: Metadata Cleaner shows what is left per file. An empty list doesn’t prove a file is clean; MAT2’s own documentation says so.


Physical security

Digital security stops at the physical world.

Device seizure

  • Know how to quickly lock down your phone (GrapheneOS: hold the power button → Lockdown; the button only appears when a PIN, password or pattern is set). Lockdown locks the phone and switches off fingerprint unlock until you enter your PIN or password, but your data stays decrypted in memory (AFU); restarting or powering off returns the phone to BFU, the stronger state if seizure is imminent
  • Practice this — it needs to be reflexive
  • Configure a duress PIN (GrapheneOS)
  • Don’t store anything you wouldn’t want found — if it doesn’t exist, it can’t be discovered

Bugging and surveillance

  • Faraday bag for your phone at sensitive meetings — no signal means no network location tracking and no live remote access; spyware already on the phone can still record and send it later, which is why the next point matters
  • Meetings on sensitive topics: phones out of the room
  • Be aware of cameras in public spaces

Social engineering Most successful attacks are social, not technical. Someone pretending to be a colleague, a fake urgent request, a trusted contact who has been compromised.

Always verify identity out-of-band before sharing sensitive information.

If you think you still mainly need one better app, that is often a sign your threat model is still too tool-focused. At this level, routines, separation and discipline are at least as important as software.


What you can’t protect against

Honesty matters. There are limits:

Zero-day exploits — unknown vulnerabilities in software that government agencies or commercial parties (NSO Group, Cellebrite) use. GrapheneOS significantly reduces the attack surface but provides no absolute guarantee.

Compromised contacts — if someone in your network grants access, your own security does nothing. Compartmentalisation limits the damage.

Physical coercion — no software protects if someone physically forces you to unlock. That is a legal and social problem, not a technical one.

Human error — one mistake can undermine everything. Routine, checklist thinking, and deliberate attention are the only protection.


Help resources


Next step

Fallback: if full OpSec isn’t realistic to sustain, scale back to a lighter profile you can actually carry.

Start here

If you need to scale back or reorient

Also relevant

Reviews and further reading