Tor on GrapheneOS: Orbot, Mullvad, and anonymous browsing
GrapheneOS and Tor are complementary. GrapheneOS reduces the attack surface at the device level; Tor hides your network identity. Together they provide a strong foundation for anonymous communication.

Tor on GrapheneOS: Orbot, Mullvad, and anonymous browsing
GrapheneOS and Tor are complementary. GrapheneOS reduces the attack surface at the device level; Tor hides your network identity. Together they provide a strong foundation for anonymous communication.
This article covers how to combine them — and why the VPN + Tor combination doesn’t always do what you think.
Who this guide is for
This guide is for readers who already use GrapheneOS and need to decide:
- when Tor on the device actually adds value
- whether Orbot, Tor Browser, and Mullvad should be combined at all
- how to avoid building a setup that sounds stronger than it really is
What you gain, and what it costs
What you gain:
- a cleaner mental model of what Tor on GrapheneOS does and does not solve
- fewer mistakes around VPN stacking and false anonymity assumptions
- a more realistic setup for anonymous browsing or sensitive sessions
What it costs:
- Tor adds speed loss, compatibility issues, and more setup friction
- mixing Tor and VPN layers can create confusion rather than safety
- anonymous browsing still requires account discipline and browser discipline
When this is overkill
If your goal is ordinary daily privacy rather than anonymity against a meaningful adversary, Tor on GrapheneOS is often too much for the first step. Harden the phone, separate accounts, and use a normal VPN only if it clearly fits your use case.
What Tor does and doesn’t do
Tor hides:
- Your IP address from websites and services you visit
- Your traffic from your internet provider (they only see that you’re connecting to the Tor network)
- What you do from any single relay: no relay sees both who you are and where you go. The exit relay does pass your traffic to the open internet, so only HTTPS keeps the content from it
Tor doesn’t hide:
- Browser fingerprints if you browse outside of Tor Browser
- Accounts you’re logged into — if you open Gmail via Tor, you link that session to your identity
- Metadata from apps that connect outside of Tor
- What an app itself gives away: outside Tor Browser, the protection depends on the app, its permissions and how Android is set up. Nearly every app can read the device’s network addresses, including the SIM’s IP, also on GrapheneOS (the Tor Project’s Tor VPN threat model; that it applies to Orbot’s VPN too is our reading)
- Traffic timing: someone who can watch both you and the site or exit relay can match the timing of your traffic
Installing Orbot
Orbot is the Guardian Project’s Tor app for Android, which the Tor Project lists among its community apps. On GrapheneOS, install it via:
Option 1 — Guardian Project F-Droid repo: Add the Guardian Project repository in F-Droid, with the fingerprint from guardianproject.info/fdroid: https://guardianproject.info/fdroid/repo?fingerprint=B7C2EEFD8DAC7806AF67DFCD92EB18126BC08312A7F2D6F3862E46013C7A6135
Then install Orbot from that repo. This is a good route if you already use F-Droid, though the build there can lag behind the newest release.
Option 2 — Google Play (via sandboxed Play): Orbot is available in the Play Store and works fine in GrapheneOS’s sandboxed Play environment.
Newer alternative: Tor VPN (beta)
The Tor Project also has its own Tor VPN for Android: a separate app from Orbot, free and open source, on Google Play and F-Droid, which gives each app its own Tor connection.
It is still beta, and the Tor Project warns: “Do not rely on it for anything other than testing. It may leak information and should not be relied on for anything sensitive.” For the journalist / source-contact use cases below, stick with Orbot or Tor Browser for now; Tor VPN is worth watching but not yet the tool to rely on.
Setting up Orbot
- Open Orbot. The main screen says Ready to connect
- Tap Choose apps and pick the apps that should go through Tor. To send all apps through Tor, pick none: Orbot then shows Full Device VPN beside Choose apps
- Tap Connect and allow Orbot’s VPN request
- Wait until Orbot shows Connected (this can take a while on the first connection)
Orbot works as a VPN on the phone: that is how it pulls apps through Tor. Full Device VPN leaves out Orbot itself and apps with their own Tor connection (Tor Browser, OnionShare, Briar, Cwtch). If Tor is blocked where you are, Choose How To Connect offers other routes (such as Smart Connect, Snowflake or your own bridges) instead of the default Direct Connection.
Power User Mode (More → Orbot Settings) is for experienced users: Orbot then runs without the VPN and only offers a local SOCKS and HTTP proxy that apps have to be set up to use themselves.
Tor + Mullvad: when do you combine them?
This is the most asked question and also the most misunderstood.
VPN before Tor (VPN → Tor)
Your device → Mullvad VPN → Tor network → Destination
What this does: Your internet provider only sees the VPN connection, not that you’re using Tor. The Tor entry node sees the IP address of the VPN server, not your real IP.
When useful: Only if you have a concrete reason to hide Tor behind a VPN. If Tor is blocked, try bridges or Snowflake in Tor Browser first.
How to set up: Android runs only one VPN at a time per profile, and starting a second one stops the first. So “Mullvad on, then Orbot” in the same profile does not stack: Orbot’s VPN replaces Mullvad’s. Workable options:
- Simplest: keep Mullvad connected and use Tor Browser, which brings its own Tor connection and doesn’t need Orbot
- For other apps: keep Mullvad as the VPN and run Orbot in Power User Mode, then set those apps to use Orbot’s local SOCKS proxy (only works for apps with proxy settings)
Note: Mullvad will know in this case that you are using Tor, or at least see traffic to the Tor network. The Tor Project generally doesn’t recommend a VPN with Tor unless you are an advanced user who can configure both safely.
Tor before VPN (Tor → VPN)
Your device → Tor network → VPN → Destination
In our view this is technically complex and rarely offers an advantage over plain Tor. Skip this unless you have a specific reason.
Tor only (no VPN)
Your device → Tor network → Destination
For most anonymity purposes, this is the best approach. Adding Mullvad adds an extra party you have to trust. Tor already hides your IP effectively on its own. If Tor is blocked, bridges are usually the first step, not an extra VPN.
Recommendation: Use Tor only for anonymous browsing and sensitive activities. Use Mullvad for daily use (streaming, updates, general traffic). Don’t use them together unless you have a concrete reason.
Interaction with GrapheneOS Always-on VPN and “Block connections without VPN”
GrapheneOS can set a VPN as Always-on VPN and block traffic if that VPN drops with Block connections without VPN (see grapheneos.org for the official explanation of these toggles).
Problem: If you have both Mullvad and Orbot installed, only one of them can be the active VPN in a profile; starting one stops the other. Android (and so GrapheneOS) doesn’t stack VPN connections. If Mullvad is set as Always-on VPN (on by default on GrapheneOS), Orbot can’t start its VPN at all.
Solution:
Scenario 1 — Tor only: Turn off Mullvad (and its Always-on setting). In Orbot, leave Choose apps empty and tap Connect. Then in Settings → Network & internet → VPN → Orbot (gear icon), check that Always-on VPN and Block connections without VPN are on. Now all apps in that profile run through Tor, and if the connection drops, their traffic is blocked. Two limits: the OS’s connectivity checks on the underlying network stay outside the VPN, and with Block on Orbot no longer leaves out Tor apps, so Tor Browser then runs Tor over Tor. Our advice: use Tor Browser in a profile without this setup.
Scenario 2 — VPN before Tor (only if bridges do not help): keep Mullvad connected and use Tor Browser, or Orbot in Power User Mode (see above). For most blocking scenarios, Tor Browser with bridges or Snowflake is the better first choice.
Scenario 3 — both, kept apart: the one-VPN limit is per profile. On GrapheneOS you can run Mullvad in your main profile and Orbot in a separate user profile with the apps that should only use Tor, each with its own Always-on setting.
Private DNS: set it to Automatic or Off (Settings → Network & internet → Private DNS). Orbot warns that strict Private DNS with a specific resolver leaks which websites and onion services you visit outside its VPN, and GrapheneOS advises against a Private DNS server with any VPN. The setting is global while VPNs are per profile, so for Scenario 3 GrapheneOS strongly recommends Off.
Tor Browser on GrapheneOS
Tor Browser is available via Google Play, via the Guardian Project F-Droid repo (which can lag behind), and via the official Tor Project downloads.
Tor Browser connects to Tor by itself; it doesn’t need Orbot. Its Security Level setting adds protection: Safer turns JavaScript off on non-HTTPS sites, Safest on all sites by default.
With Orbot’s VPN on, Vanadium (GrapheneOS’s default browser) also runs through Tor, but the Tor Project strongly discourages Tor with any browser other than Tor Browser, because of the risk of deanonymization and leaks; Tor Browser is the one built to resist fingerprinting. For anything sensitive: Tor Browser, not Vanadium via Orbot. For high risk, the Tor Project points to Tails, a separate desktop OS.
Practical usage
When to use Tor:
- Source contact as a journalist and .onion addresses: Tor Browser (SecureDrop names Tor Browser or Tails), not another browser through Orbot
- Browsing where IP address must not be traceable: Tor Browser
- Other apps that have to go through Tor: Orbot
- Countries with internet censorship: Tor Browser or Orbot, with bridges if needed
When to use Mullvad (Orbot off):
- Daily use (streaming, updates, email)
- Situations where Tor is too slow
- Apps that don’t work via Tor (banking, some government portals)
When neither:
- At home, trusted network, non-sensitive activities
Next step
Go further
- SecureDrop guide — source protection, .onion workflows, and anonymous document submission
- GrapheneOS hardening guide — all security settings
- VPN comparison — choosing a provider without overestimating VPN marketing
Profiles
- Profile: journalist or activist — when Tor on GrapheneOS is the right tool
- Profile: high risk — complete approach for high threat level
Reviews
- Mullvad VPN review — anonymous payment, only a random account number (no email address or personal details)
Anonymous messaging via Tor
- SimpleX Chat guide — messaging without an identifier, over Tor
- Briar guide — P2P over Tor, also works without internet