Briar: peer-to-peer (P2P) messaging without internet, servers, or phone number

Every other messaging app in this series has one thing in common: they depend on internet connectivity in normal use. Briar can also work without it.

Briar: peer-to-peer (P2P) messaging without internet, servers, or phone number

Briar: peer-to-peer messaging that also works without internet, servers, or a phone number

Every other messaging app in this series has one thing in common: they depend on internet connectivity in normal use. Briar can also work without it.

Briar works peer-to-peer. There are no servers. Messages go directly from device to device: via the Tor network when internet is available, via Bluetooth or local Wi-Fi when it isn’t, and by USB stick or SD card if nothing else works. If the network goes down, through outage, censorship, or emergency, Briar keeps working locally with contacts in Bluetooth range or on the same Wi-Fi network.

That makes Briar fundamentally different from Signal, Session, or Threema. Not better for daily use — but irreplaceable in situations where the infrastructure itself cannot be trusted.


Project status (November 2026)

On 9 July 2026 the Briar project announced that it is in maintenance mode: for now it only makes essential security updates and bug fixes. The team says it had spent years trying to fix long-standing problems (high battery use and unreliable background operation on Android, no account backup, no file attachments, and a difficult experience for adding contacts and communicating offline) but had no funding and could only work on Briar in spare time. In 2025 it decided to shut the project down and released a final update for Android and desktop so the app would keep working as long as possible. Because people kept using and supporting it, the project continued in maintenance mode, and it says the rumours of a shutdown are out of date. It hopes to make incremental progress on those problems eventually.

Updates are still coming: the Android app reached 1.5.24 on 30 October 2026 (the October releases mainly updated Tor), Briar Desktop is at 0.6.5-beta (February 2026), and the last Mailbox release is 1.0.9 (July 2024).

What this means for you: the design (Tor online, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi offline, no servers) has not changed, and there is still almost nothing else like it for outages and censorship, so Briar can still be the right tool. But expect no new features and expect the limitations in this guide to stay. Check that the Android app is still receiving updates before you rely on it (the date of the latest version in F-Droid or Google Play), and keep a second channel for anyone who depends on you being reachable. Source: Briar news, 9 July 2026.


Who this guide is for

This guide is mainly for readers who have a concrete reason to care about communication during outages, censorship, or infrastructure failure.

It fits especially:

  • activists or journalists in hostile or unstable network environments
  • organisations that need communication without trusting external infrastructure
  • readers who explicitly need Tor, Bluetooth, or local Wi-Fi fallback on the same tool

For most readers, Briar is not a normal daily messenger recommendation. It is the right tool when infrastructure independence is the requirement, not when you just want “more private chat.”


What you gain, and what it costs

If you use Briar, you usually gain:

  • messaging without servers or phone numbers
  • communication that can keep working during outages or censorship
  • stronger resistance to central logging and infrastructure dependence

But it costs something:

  • more battery usage
  • more contact friction and a smaller user base
  • no iOS support and weaker everyday convenience than mainstream messengers

For the right profile that is absolutely worth it. It becomes overkill when convenience, reachability, and broad contact adoption matter more than infrastructure independence.


How Briar works

Briar has no central servers. Messages synchronize as soon as two devices connect — via whatever channel is available.

Online (Tor): Messages travel via the Tor network. Your public IP address is hidden from your contact. Someone watching the network can see that you connect to Tor, not who you talk to. If Tor is blocked, go to Settings → Connections → Connection method for Tor network and choose Use Tor network with bridges; the default, Automatic based on location, decides by your location. (Your local network addresses do go to your contacts; see What your contacts can see.)

Offline (Bluetooth): Short range only. No cellular network, no WiFi, no internet required. If your phones don’t connect by themselves, open the chat and use the menu: Connections → Connect via Bluetooth, both at the same time.

Offline (Wi-Fi / local network): Works when both phones are on the same Wi-Fi network, also if that network has no internet. Useful during large-scale outages or in isolated environments.

Offline (USB stick or SD card): in the chat menu, Connections → Connect via Removable Drive. Send Data writes everything waiting for that contact to an encrypted file (messages, attachments, blogs, forums, private groups); they import it with Receive Data. You have 28 days to get the file to them.

Without internet, how far messages get: private messages reach a contact only when your phones are in Bluetooth range or on the same Wi-Fi network, or by a file on a removable drive; Briar does not pass them through other people’s phones. Posts in groups, forums and blogs can travel further: each member’s phone passes them on to other members it is connected to as a contact, and they pass them on again. So during a shutdown a post spreads through the group over time as members meet, from minutes to days, not instantly. Phones of people outside the group never carry it. Source: Briar FAQ, “When do posts in forums/groups/blogs get shared with others?”

Prepare before a shutdown: adding a contact at a distance runs over Tor, so it stops working when the internet does. Add people nearby while you can. Someone who doesn’t have Briar yet can get it from your phone with Settings → Share this app offline, which starts a Wi-Fi hotspot.

You make contact by scanning each other’s QR code in person. This also verifies identity cryptographically. A contact added by briar:// link or by introduction is less verified, and Briar shows the difference next to the nickname: three green # for a QR scan, two orange # for a link or introduction. The 2023 audit noted that such a contact can’t be upgraded later (see Security audit).


Encryption

Briar uses the Bramble Protocol Suite — a fully custom-built stack of cryptographic protocols:

  • Key exchange via BQP when you scan QR codes, and via the Bramble Handshake Protocol when you swap briar:// links
  • Session encryption via Bramble Transport Protocol (BTP)
  • Sync via Bramble Synchronisation Protocol

Messages, group conversations, and forums are all end-to-end encrypted. (Briar can attach images but not general files; its developers list file attachments as a missing feature.) Briar’s transport protocol is also obfuscated: to anyone except sender and recipient, the data on the wire looks like random bytes.

Forward secrecy: Briar derives temporary keys that it rotates and deletes periodically. Once both sides have deleted a key, it can’t be rebuilt, even from a phone seized later, so recorded traffic stays unreadable. It doesn’t protect messages still stored on a phone someone can unlock. It’s also why Briar has no account backup: a backup holding keys would undo this (FAQ).


What outsiders can’t see

Briar has no message servers, so there are no server logs of your chats. The project says it has no access to the content or metadata of your communication; it stores only what you choose to send with Send feedback or a crash report, and keeps its website logs for seven days (privacy policy).

  • Message content: End-to-end encrypted
  • Public IP address: Hidden via Tor (when using internet)
  • Contact list: Encrypted, stored on your device only
  • Who talks to whom: Over Tor, not visible to ISP, network administrators, or the Briar project. They can see the Tor connections themselves; bridges make those harder to block

With Bluetooth or local Wi-Fi nothing goes over the internet. It is still radio, though: people nearby can see that a device is using Bluetooth or is on the same Wi-Fi network, even if they can’t read anything. Briar’s transport protocol doesn’t itself hide who is talking to whom (spec); that part comes from Tor.


What your contacts can see

Briar hides who you talk to from outsiders. It does not hide who you are from the people you talk to. The project’s own FAQ answers “Does Briar provide anonymity?” with “No”: it offers unlinkability (nobody else can find out who your contacts are), not anonymity towards your contacts.

So that contacts can reach you over every channel, Briar sends each of them:

  • your device’s Bluetooth address, also when you added the contact remotely with a briar:// link and never met
  • the five most recent local network (LAN) IPv4 addresses and ports of your Wi-Fi connection
  • your most recent IPv6 link-local address on Wi-Fi; on some Android phones this is derived from the hardware MAC address, a fixed device identifier like the Bluetooth address
  • the address of your Briar Tor onion service
  • when you’re online: only your contacts can tell, but Briar can’t hide it from them

Your public internet IP stays hidden behind Tor. None of these addresses gives away your name or location on its own, but a contact who has them can use them to confirm a guess. Briar’s own example: a LAN address received from an “anonymous” whistleblower that matches the address a café router handed to a suspect’s laptop. A request to make this sharing optional dates from 2021 and was still open when we last read it in October 2026 (issue #1998); with the project in maintenance mode, don’t expect it to change.

What this means: Briar fits people who already know each other, such as a team, a group of activists, or a family during an outage. It is not the tool for a source who has to stay unknown to the person they contact; for anonymous submissions to journalists, use SecureDrop. And if a contact could turn hostile or have their phone seized, assume these addresses end up with whoever holds it. Source: Briar FAQ, “Does Briar provide anonymity?”.


Security audit

Briar has had two independent audits, not one.

Cure53, March 2017: the first audit, before Briar’s beta. It found twelve issues, mostly low to medium, and one rated High: a DNS leak when importing an RSS feed, which could expose your real IP address on the local network. The reviewers called the cryptographic code “exceptionally clear and sound”. The project says all issues were fixed before the beta (report).

Radically Open Security, September-October 2023 (via the Open Technology Fund): a second audit, requested after an ETH Zürich research project found three security issues earlier in 2023 (fixed in versions 1.4.22 and 1.5.3: a denial-of-service via invalid messages, a message duplication attack in forums, and a handshake design flaw the project says was not exploitable). This audit found 6 issues: one moderate-risk (overlay attacks on Android, preventable on Android 12+) and five low-risk (including a weak pre-shared key when sharing the app over Wi-Fi), nothing in the higher-risk categories. A retest in February-March 2024 confirmed 4 of 6 resolved. The other two were planned for later: Briar’s connection to Tor over TCP, which Android doesn’t sandbox, and contacts added remotely not being able to become fully verified later (OTF).

What the audits don’t cover: the code written since. We found no audit newer than that 2024 retest, and the project’s FAQ says it can’t commission one for every release. Treat later versions, including 1.5.24, as unaudited.


Installing and getting started

Android: via Google Play, F-Droid, or direct APK; start from Briar’s download page. Without Google, use F-Droid or the APK.

Desktop (Linux, Windows, macOS): Briar Desktop, still in beta. It isn’t the offline tool: per the project’s own table it has Tor and same-network Wi-Fi, but no Bluetooth, no removable drives, no Tor bridges, and no adding contacts nearby.

iOS: not available. The project’s answer to “will there be an iOS version?” is “Probably not”: iOS restricts background apps much more than Android, and push notifications would expose metadata to Apple (FAQ).

On first launch:

  1. Choose a nickname (stored on your device; it is shown next to what you post and can’t be changed later)
  2. Choose a password. Briar’s advice is four random words, or ten random letters, numbers and symbols. Its strength meter only counts different characters (it accepts 6 and shows strong from 12), so don’t rely on the meter alone. There is no reset: if you forget it or uninstall Briar, you create a new account and lose your contacts and messages
  3. No email, phone number, or account required

Already using Briar? Nothing to redo. Three things worth checking: that you have the latest version, that you and each contact really scanned both ways when you met, and that your password is a strong one, because it can’t be reset.

Making contact: tap + → Add contact nearby, and both of you scan each other’s QR code (one scan is not enough). Someone who isn’t with you: + → Add contact at a distance, and swap briar:// links over a channel you trust. If that hasn’t connected after 48 hours, both of you delete the pending contact and add each other’s links again. Adding a contact nearby asks for the camera and, depending on your Android version, for location or nearby-devices permission to find Bluetooth devices; Briar says it doesn’t store or share your location.


If your phone is lost or taken

No backup, no second device. Your account exists only on this phone. A lost phone, an uninstall or a forgotten password means a new account and adding everyone again.

Panic button. Briar has no button of its own: it reacts to a separate panic app, such as Ripple. Set it up under Settings → Security → Panic button setup. By default a panic signal only signs you out. To wipe instead, pick your app under Panic Button App and turn on Delete Account, which permanently deletes your identities, contacts and messages. Your contacts keep their own copies.

Signed out. After a restart Briar shows a “Signed out of Briar” reminder, and you receive nothing until you sign back in.

App lock (Settings → Security) uses your phone’s screen lock to protect Briar while you’re signed in. Disappearing messages (chat menu) delete after 7 days; the recipient can still copy them.


Briar Mailbox

Without a Mailbox, Briar syncs messages only when both devices are connected at the same time. That’s a limitation for daily use: if the recipient is offline, messages are only delivered when you’re both online again.

Briar Mailbox partially solves this. It’s a separate app for a spare Android device that you keep on power and Wi-Fi. Contacts can send you encrypted messages through it while you’re offline, and you can leave messages for contacts who are offline. When Briar comes online it fetches them automatically.

The Mailbox only delivers encrypted messages between its owner and their contacts; whoever holds the device cannot read the content. It’s your own infrastructure, not Briar’s. All its connections go through Tor, so it needs internet and won’t help during a shutdown.


Honest caveats

Battery consumption — Briar has no server receiving messages on your behalf. The app must run actively in the background to receive messages. This uses more battery than apps with central servers; Briar asks you to let it ignore battery optimization for exactly this reason. To limit the drain, Briar’s settings let you turn off Use mobile data (internet only on Wi-Fi) or turn on Connect to the Internet only when charging. Phones that kill background apps make this worse: Briar has extra setup screens for Huawei and Xiaomi, and warns you when it was unable to run in the background.

No iOS: Briar is not available for iPhone or iPad, and the project doesn’t expect that to change (see Installing).

Not anonymous to your contacts — every contact receives your Bluetooth address and local network addresses (see What your contacts can see).

Small user base: your contacts need Briar too, and in our assessment few people already have it.

More complex contact verification — There’s no search function. You often connect by being physically near someone and scanning QR codes, though trusted contacts can also introduce each other remotely.


Who Briar is for

Direct value:

  • Activists in countries with aggressive internet surveillance or censorship
  • Journalists in environments where communication infrastructure cannot be trusted
  • People who need to communicate during internet outages or network failures
  • Anyone who wants to remain reachable via Bluetooth without internet
  • Organizations that want to be completely independent of external infrastructure

Less suitable for:

  • Daily use as a primary messaging app (battery consumption, iOS limitation)
  • iPhone users (not available)
  • Situations where speed and convenience are the priority

Briar vs. the rest

Briar Signal Session Threema
Phone number required No Yes No No
Works without internet Yes (Bluetooth/Wi-Fi) No No No
Central server No (fully P2P) Yes (US company) No (decentralized) Yes (Switzerland)
Onion routing Yes (Tor) No Yes (own network) No
iOS No Yes Yes Yes
Cost Free Free Free Paid, one-time (€6.49 / $7.49 Android, €7.99 / $6.99 iPhone)
Audit Cure53 2017; Radically Open Security 2023 (retested 2024) See review Quarkslab Cure53 2024 (desktop app)

Briar is one of the few privacy messengers that can still work when there is no internet. For that specific scenario, it remains unusually strong.


Background

Briar was started by Michael Rogers, with the goal of supporting freedom of expression and privacy in environments where infrastructure cannot be trusted. It is run by a voluntary board; the project’s site lists Nico Alt, Julian Dehm, Torsten Grote and Michael Rogers as of April 2023. Past funders include the Open Technology Fund, NLnet, and Access Now. The July 2026 announcement says the project had no funding while it worked out its future, and says nothing further about funding today. The source code is open source.

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