SecureDrop: submitting documents anonymously to a newsroom
If you want to pass sensitive information to a journalist, email is not safe — even with PGP. PGP encrypts the content, not the envelope: who sends to whom, when, via which server, and the subject line stay visible. If your email account is ever compromised or subpoenaed, that connection is visible.

SecureDrop: submitting documents anonymously to a newsroom
If you want to pass sensitive information to a journalist, email is not safe — even with PGP. PGP encrypts the content, not the envelope: who sends to whom, when, via which server, and the subject line stay visible. If your email account is ever compromised or subpoenaed, that connection is visible.
SecureDrop solves this differently. It’s an open-source system built specifically for source protection — without email, without a classic account, and reachable only through Tor. The newsroom does not get identifying details about you unless you give them yourself.
Who this guide is for
This guide is mainly for whistleblowers, sources, and journalists working with genuinely sensitive document submission.
It fits especially:
- sources who need to send documents to a newsroom without exposing a personal account
- journalists deciding whether SecureDrop is the right intake method for source contact
- readers in higher-risk or source-protection contexts where ordinary email is clearly not enough
For most readers, this is not a general-purpose communication tool. It is for anonymous document submission and source contact in specific high-stakes situations.
What you gain, and what it costs
If you use SecureDrop properly, you usually gain:
- much less linkability between you and the newsroom
- a stronger submission path than normal email, even encrypted email
- a workflow designed specifically for anonymous source contact
But it costs something:
- more preparation and more care around device security
- more friction than ordinary messaging
- the need to handle metadata and behavioural traces correctly yourself
For source protection this is a reasonable trade. It becomes overkill when the situation does not actually require anonymous submission or when a lower-friction secure channel would already be sufficient.
How SecureDrop works
SecureDrop runs on servers owned and managed by the newsroom itself. Sources reach it only through the Tor network, at a .onion address.
The process for a source:
- Open Tor Browser
- Navigate to the newsroom’s .onion address
- Get a codename (no name, no email, no account)
- Submit your message or document — encrypted, over Tor
- The newsroom decrypts your submission on a computer that is never connected to the internet
- To read replies or send more: log in with your codename — not with personal credentials
The journalist receives your message without you creating an ordinary account. That protects you strongly, but your anonymity also depends on your device, network, documents and behaviour.
What SecureDrop protects — and what it doesn’t
Protected:
- Your identity from the newsroom — they don’t know who you are unless you tell them
- Your identity from third parties who subpoena the server — SecureDrop says it does not log your IP address, browser or computer, and it keeps little metadata
- The connection — Tor hides your IP address from the server
- The content — submissions are stored encrypted
Not protected:
- Metadata in documents you submit — remove it first (see metadata guide)
- Printer steganography if you submit printed documents (see metadata guide)
- What’s on your device — if your device is compromised, SecureDrop doesn’t help
- That you use Tor — your network can see Tor use, even later from its logs
- Patterns in your behaviour — if you log in every day at 9:03 from the same location, that’s traceable regardless of SecureDrop
Before you start: device security
SecureDrop is only as strong as the device you use it from.
Prefer:
- Tails OS — an operating system you boot from USB, leaves no traces on the computer, and automatically routes through Tor. SecureDrop recommends it, ideally on a computer used only for this.
- Otherwise: desktop Tor Browser on a computer you use only for this purpose, not connected to your regular accounts. Not a phone: SecureDrop warns that Tor Browser for Android does not give the same protection.
Never use:
- Your work laptop or network
- A device that may already be compromised
- Your home internet connection — use a public network you don’t normally visit, such as a busy café
Finding SecureDrop
Not every newsroom has SecureDrop. Those that do publish their .onion address on their own website — often on a page like “tips” or “contact for sources”.
Newsrooms with SecureDrop change over time. Use the current SecureDrop directory and then always verify the onion address through the newsroom’s own official website as well. On 15 November 2026 the directory listed no organisation in the Netherlands or Belgium, and none that accepts Dutch.
Verification: Always verify the .onion address through the newsroom’s official website and preferably also via the SecureDrop Directory. If the two don’t match, don’t submit. Do not rely on search engines, screenshots, or forwarded links.
Step by step: submitting a document
This assumes a first submission. Already have a codename? Do steps 2 and 3, then use Log in on the newsroom’s SecureDrop page (step 7).
Step 1 — Remove metadata
Remove all metadata from documents before submitting. Use MAT2 or ExifTool. See the metadata guide. While preparing, don’t use an AI chatbot or a search engine you are logged in to: SecureDrop warns that your prompt and search history can be used to identify you.
Step 2 — Open Tor Browser at Safest
Download Tor Browser from torproject.org. Launch it on a clean computer, on a public network (see above). Set the security level to Safest: click the shield icon (Security level) in the toolbar, then Settings…, Change security level, choose Safest and Save and restart. SecureDrop shows a warning banner until you do this.
Step 3 — Navigate to the .onion address
Copy the .onion address from the newsroom’s website. Paste it into the Tor Browser address bar. Verify the address carefully.
Step 4 — Get a codename
Click Get Started. SecureDrop shows a series of random words: your codename, which is your username and password at once. There is no recovery. SecureDrop advises memorising it; if you can’t yet, write it on paper — not digitally — and destroy the paper once you know it by heart.
Step 5 — Submit your document
Upload a file, type a message, or both, and click Submit. One file per submission, up to 500 MB: put several files in a ZIP, or submit again. Files are encrypted when they arrive.
Step 6 — Log out and clear the session
Click Log out, then the New identity button in the Tor Browser toolbar. That closes your tabs and clears the session.
Step 7 — Coming back for replies
Later, click Log in on the same SecureDrop page and enter your codename. Read any reply, then delete it, so someone who learns your codename can’t read it.
For journalists: setting up SecureDrop
SecureDrop isn’t only for sources — as a journalist or editor you can also receive via SecureDrop.
SecureDrop needs its own hardware: two servers, a dedicated firewall, and at least two computers that run Tails, one of them the air-gapped viewing station where submissions are decrypted. Installation documentation is at docs.securedrop.org.
For most newsrooms without dedicated server experience, it’s advisable to work with someone who has Linux server administration experience. Freedom of the Press Foundation, which maintains SecureDrop, helps newsrooms with installation (contact) and also offers paid support.
Freelancer without a newsroom? SecureDrop’s own servers and management are a lot for one person, although the directory lists a few individual journalists. Use Signal (with a separate number and a username) for source intake, or consider Hush Line — an open-source tip line with no self-hosting required, with a free tier, an onion address and end-to-end encryption via your own PGP key. Hush Line accepts messages only, no files; when the sender has JavaScript off (Tor Browser at Safest) it encrypts on the server instead, and it says itself that it is not a replacement for SecureDrop. Its 2024 audit by Subgraph ran through the Open Technology Fund’s Security Lab. Affiliating with an existing newsroom that already runs SecureDrop is still an option too. See Signal and Molly for source contact without your own server.
Alternatives
SecureDrop is built for newsrooms. There are alternatives for situations where SecureDrop is unavailable:
- GlobaLeaks — similar system, also open-source, built as a configurable framework for many kinds of organisations (GlobaLeaks says more than 30,000 use it)
- Hush Line — open-source tip line with no self-hosting required, independently audited, with an onion address; messages only, no files; a fit for freelancers or small newsrooms without server management
- Signal — secure for communication, but Signal knows your phone number. Use as a temporary measure while setting up a SecureDrop connection.
- Encrypted email (PGP) — better than unencrypted, but metadata remains visible. See the PGP guide.
Next step
Go further
- Removing metadata from documents — remove the most obvious deanonymising leak from your files before submitting
- PGP: encrypted email — alternative when the newsroom has no SecureDrop
Profiles
- Profile: journalist or activist — complete profile for journalists
Reviews
- Tails OS review — recommended OS for SecureDrop use