GrapheneOS hardening guide: every setting explained

GrapheneOS is already hardened out of the box, but it offers many extra security settings. This guide explains each one, so you can choose deliberately how far to go.

GrapheneOS hardening guide: every setting explained

GrapheneOS hardening guide: every setting explained

GrapheneOS is already hardened out of the box, but it offers many extra security settings. This guide explains each one, so you can choose deliberately how far to go.

Who this guide is for. This guide is for people who already installed GrapheneOS and want to decide deliberately how far to harden it instead of just toggling settings blindly. For the full, current list of hardening features, see grapheneos.org/features.

It fits especially:

  • privacy-conscious daily users who want a stronger baseline
  • readers moving beyond the first setup and into actual hardening choices
  • higher-risk users who need to understand what the settings really do before going stricter

What you gain, and what it costs

If you harden GrapheneOS with intention, you gain:

  • a phone that is materially harder to misuse or compromise than stock Android
  • clearer boundaries around network access, app behavior, sensors, and physical access
  • a setup that reflects your real risk model instead of default settings

What it costs:

  • setup time and reading
  • some convenience, depending on how strict you go
  • the need to choose settings based on your own use case rather than copying a maximalist checklist

When this is overkill

If you only just installed GrapheneOS, do not treat this as a race to turn on every hardening option. A stable, understandable setup is better than a stricter one you later undo because it gets in the way. How far to go depends on your profile: for privacy conscious readers a stable setup is a fine place to stop; for journalist or activist and high risk, settings such as USB restrictions, auto-reboot and a duress PIN earn their extra friction.

This guide becomes most useful once you are ready to move from “it runs” to “I know why these security choices matter for me.”

You’ve installed GrapheneOS. First setup is done. Now: how far do you go?

GrapheneOS has dozens of security and privacy settings that do not exist on standard Android or are disabled there by default. This guide walks through the important ones so you understand what they do and can decide deliberately.

Level: You’ve already installed GrapheneOS and done the basic setup. Reading time: ~20 minutes


How to read this guide

Each section covers:

  • What the setting does
  • Why it matters
  • Recommendation (→)

The recommendations are for an average privacy-conscious user. Journalists, activists or other high-risk users can go stricter.


GrapheneOS vs stock Android: what actually differs

Stock Android on a Pixel is not weak. It already has the app sandbox, verified boot, full encryption and standard exploit mitigations, and GrapheneOS builds on all of that rather than replacing it. Google has also added Advanced Protection (Android 16+), an opt-in mode that closes part of the gap. So the fair comparison is three setups on the same Pixel, not two:

Stock Android, defaults Stock + Advanced Protection GrapheneOS
USB port while locked No port-level block USB protection while locked Charging-only when locked by default; new connections blocked at hardware and kernel level¹
Reboot to “before first unlock” Optional restart after 72 hours locked On: after 72 hours locked On: after 18 hours by default, adjustable from 10 minutes to 72 hours
Memory tagging (MTE, Pixel 8+) Developer option only On for supported apps On for the kernel and base OS; opt-in for all apps
Memory allocator Standard Standard hardened_malloc
Google Play services Built in, with privileged system access Same Not included; optional as an ordinary sandboxed app
Default background connections Google servers Google servers GrapheneOS servers (connectivity check, network time, location assistance)
Per-app network toggle No No Yes
Per-app sensor toggle No No Yes
Wi-Fi MAC address Random, but fixed per network Same New random address per connection
Mobile network 2G can be turned off 2G blocked 2G can be turned off, plus an LTE-only mode
Installing apps from outside the Play Store Allowed per app Blocked Allowed per app
Lock screen extras — — Optional PIN scrambling; duress PIN that wipes the phone
Fingerprint attempts 20, with delays Same 5, then PIN or password; optional second-factor PIN
Maximum password length 16 characters Same 128 characters
Security patches Monthly Pixel update Same Same monthly patches plus extra fixes; optional “security preview” builds with Android patches months before Google’s bulletin

¹ Based on GrapheneOS’s own documentation, which says Android’s standard USB block only works at a higher OS level. PrivacyGear has not tested either implementation.

The table reflects Android 17 and GrapheneOS as of November 2026; the stock fingerprint and password figures come from GrapheneOS’s features page, which compares against Android 16. GrapheneOS’s features page is the complete list; Google’s Advanced Protection help page lists what that mode switches on.

What this means in practice:

  • Advanced Protection closes the physical-access gap. USB, the reboot timer, MTE and 2G are all covered. It is also stricter than GrapheneOS in one place: it blocks installing apps from unknown sources (F-Droid, a downloaded APK) and updates to apps installed that way.
  • It does not change who has privileged access. On stock Android, Google Play services remain a privileged part of the system. You also get no per-app network or sensor toggles, and the phone still talks to Google by default. Those differences are structural; no setting on stock Android removes them.
  • The biggest GrapheneOS differences need no action from you. hardened_malloc, the kernel hardening and the sandboxed Play services are already on. The rest of this guide covers the parts you do choose.

Where you can reasonably stop: if your concern is theft, a lost phone or someone with brief physical access, a stock Pixel with Advanced Protection on already gets you most of that protection. See Android privacy without a custom ROM. GrapheneOS is worth the switch if you also want Google’s software out of a privileged position, or you need stronger defenses against exploits you cannot patch yourself.


1. Screen lock and access

PIN vs password vs biometrics

GrapheneOS offers three unlock options:

PIN (6+ digits) Good for daily use. Use at least six random digits; avoid birthdays or 123456.

Alphanumeric password Strongest option. Harder to guess, harder to shoulder-surf. Slower to enter.

Fingerprint Convenient, but the law can treat your finger and your code differently. In the Netherlands, a suspect can’t be ordered to hand over a code, while the Hoge Raad ruled in 2021 that police may press a suspect’s thumb onto a seized phone by force (ECLI:NL:HR:2021:202). Rules differ per country; see the legal section of the duress PIN guide.

→ Use at minimum a 6-digit PIN. Add fingerprint as a supplement, not a replacement.

Setting auto-lock

Settings → Security & privacy → Device unlock → Screen lock, enter your PIN or password, then scroll past the lock types to Screen lock settings → Lock after screen timeout

This decides how long after the screen turns off the phone locks. With Immediately there is no delay and no window.

→ Set to Immediately.

Lockdown mode

GrapheneOS has a lockdown option: hold the power button until the menu appears, then tap Lockdown (no menu? see Settings → System → Gestures → Press & hold power button). This:

  • Temporarily disables biometrics
  • Requires PIN to unlock
  • Hides notifications on lock screen

Use this if you expect your phone to be inspected — at a border crossing, police stop, or if you hand it to someone.

→ Know this feature and use it when relevant.


2. USB and physical access

Restrict USB connections

Settings → Security & privacy → Exploit protection → USB-C port

The setting has five modes: Off, Charging-only, Charging-only when locked, Charging-only when locked except before first unlock, and On. GrapheneOS already defaults to “Charging-only when locked”, which is stricter than stock Android. New USB connections are blocked as soon as the phone is locked, at both the hardware and OS level.

→ Keep the default, or disable USB entirely if you charge wirelessly and do not need it.

Disable USB entirely

You can turn USB off entirely: no charging, no data.

Settings → Security & privacy → Exploit protection → USB-C port → Off

Useful if you charge wirelessly only. You can re-enable temporarily when needed. The phone still charges by cable while it is switched off, so you can’t lock yourself out of charging.

→ Consider this if you charge wirelessly and don’t need USB.


3. Network and connections

MAC address randomisation

GrapheneOS randomises the MAC address per connection by default. That is stricter than standard Android, which usually uses one random MAC per network.

You can still review the setting per network:

Settings → Network & internet → Internet → [network] (gear icon) → Privacy

If per-connection randomisation causes compatibility issues with a router, you can fall back to Use per-network randomized MAC.

→ Keep the default. Only fall back to per-network randomisation if you actually need it.

Set private DNS

By default your phone uses the DNS of the network it is on (your carrier or Wi-Fi provider). They can see which domains you look up.

GrapheneOS supports Private DNS via DNS-over-TLS (DoT):

Settings → Network & internet → Private DNS → Private DNS provider hostname

Reliable options:

  • dns.quad9.net — Quad9, doesn’t record IP addresses, filters malware
  • one.one.one.one — Cloudflare, fast, policy-based privacy guarantees

→ Choose Quad9. Avoid Google’s DNS for privacy. Using a VPN? Leave Private DNS off: it overrides the VPN’s DNS, and GrapheneOS advises against combining them. Using base.dns.mullvad.net or another Mullvad hostname? Mullvad set 2 November 2026 as the end date of its public DNS; switch to dns.quad9.net.

Per-app network access

GrapheneOS has built-in per-app network control. This is binary: network access is either allowed or fully blocked for that app, including indirect access through OS components.

Settings → Apps → [app] → Permissions → Network

Use this for apps that don’t need internet. A note app, calculator, or photo editor has no reason to send data.

→ Go through your apps. Block internet for everything that doesn’t need it.

Turn off Bluetooth and NFC when not in use

Bluetooth and NFC are attack surfaces, so GrapheneOS leaves both off until you turn them on.

Turn them off again via quick settings when not in use. Or:

Settings → Connected devices → Connection preferences → NFC → Use NFC (off)

→ Off when not needed. On when you need them.


4. Sensor permissions and access

Sensor access per app

GrapheneOS gives you control over which sensors an app can use: camera, microphone, location, accelerometer, barometer.

Settings → Security & privacy → Privacy controls → Permission manager

Go through each category:

Location

  • Use “Allow only while using the app” — never “Allow all the time” unless essential
  • Turn off “Use precise location” for apps that don’t need it
  • Revoke location entirely for apps with no clear reason

Camera and microphone

  • Grant only when the app actively needs it
  • GrapheneOS shows an indicator when camera or microphone is active

Sensors GrapheneOS has an extra “Sensors” category that controls access to motion sensors, barometer, and other hardware. This does not exist on standard Android.

Settings → Security & privacy → Privacy controls → Permission manager → Sensors

The Sensors permission is allowed by default so apps don’t break. You can make it denied by default for apps you install yourself: Settings → Security & privacy → More security & privacy → Allow Sensors permission to apps by default (off).

→ Revoke sensor permissions for all apps that don’t clearly need them.

Camera and microphone toggles

Android has global switches for camera and microphone:

Settings → Security & privacy → Privacy controls → Camera access (Off = no app can use the camera) Settings → Security & privacy → Privacy controls → Microphone access (Off = no audio input)

This is different from per-app permissions: it’s one block for all apps at once. It is a switch in the operating system, not a hardware switch.

→ Use this when you don’t need the camera or microphone for an extended period.


5. Notifications and lock screen

Notifications on lock screen

Settings → Notifications → Notifications on lock screen → Show sensitive content (off)

With this switch off, sensitive content only shows when the phone is unlocked. With it on, messages, names, and content can be visible when your phone is on a table.

To hide notifications on the lock screen entirely, turn off Show on lock screen on the same screen.

→ Turn Show sensitive content off; hide lock screen notifications entirely if you want more.

Notification history

Settings → Notifications → Notification history → Use notification history (off)

This is off unless you turned it on. When on, someone with access to your unlocked phone can see the history.

→ Leave it off.


6. Exploit mitigations

This is one of the areas where GrapheneOS meaningfully differs from standard Android.

Memory tagging (MTE)

On supported Pixels (Pixel 8 and newer), GrapheneOS offers Memory Tagging Extension — hardware-level protection against a class of attacks (buffer overflows, use-after-free). This can crash poorly written apps.

Settings → Security & privacy → Exploit protection → Memory tagging → Enable by default

GrapheneOS already uses MTE for the kernel and preinstalled apps. On Pixel 8 and newer, you can extend it to all installed apps, and disable it per app only if something crashes.

→ On Pixel 8+, consider enabling MTE for all apps. Disable it only for the rare app that breaks.

Hardened malloc

GrapheneOS uses a custom memory allocator (hardened malloc) that makes a class of memory exploits harder. This is active by default — no action needed.

Auto-reboot

Settings → Security & privacy → Exploit protection → Auto reboot

After a configurable period (default 18 hours, settable from 10 minutes to 72 hours), the phone automatically restarts if it has not been unlocked. This returns encryption to “Before First Unlock” (BFU) — the strongest encryption state.

Your data is then at rest until the next unlock, which leaves a forensic tool far less to work with (our inference).

→ Leave it on at the default 18 hours. Lower it to 8-12 hours if you want stricter protection.

Clearing data from memory

GrapheneOS zeroes memory as soon as it is freed, in both the apps’ and the kernel’s memory allocators. A side benefit: sensitive data (such as keys derived from your PIN) doesn’t linger in memory after use.

Active by default, no setting needed. This is about memory, not stored files: GrapheneOS has no separate “secure delete” for files. Deleted files are protected by the storage encryption, and auto reboot puts the keys back at rest.


7. Apps and installation

Unknown sources per app

Settings → Apps → Special app access → Install unknown apps

This permission is per app (as on any current Android): only the apps you designate can install APKs (such as F-Droid or Obtainium).

→ Leave it on only for F-Droid or Obtainium. If you installed one of them from your browser, switch it off for the browser again afterwards.

App sandboxing and profiles

Each app runs in its own sandbox. Additionally, you can separate apps into profiles (see the profiles guide).

Use a separate profile for:

  • Apps you don’t fully trust but need
  • Work-related apps
  • Apps with sandboxed Google Play

→ See the profiles guide for full explanation.

Check app permissions after install

After installing any app: go to its permissions and revoke everything it doesn’t need.

Settings → Apps → [app] → Permissions

Ask yourself for each permission: does this app actually need this to function?


8. Encryption

GrapheneOS encrypts storage by default. There’s no setting to enable it — it’s always on.

What you can check:

Encryption status

Settings → Security & privacy → More security & privacy → Encryption & credentials

Under Encryption it should say “Encrypted”.

Before First Unlock (BFU) vs After First Unlock (AFU)

An important concept:

  • BFU: Phone just booted, not yet unlocked. Your data is at rest, with the keys not yet in memory.
  • AFU: Phone has been unlocked at least once. Keys loaded into memory. More attack surface.

Auto-reboot (see above) periodically returns you to BFU.


9. Network isolation and anonymity

Tor integration

GrapheneOS has no Tor routing of its own; the Orbot app provides it. Install Orbot from F-Droid (Guardian Project repo) and assign apps to run through Tor.

Tor is slower but anonymises your IP address. Use it for apps where IP anonymity matters.

→ Use Orbot + Tor for apps where IP anonymity matters; for browsing, use Tor Browser.

VPN

Do not choose a VPN specifically “for GrapheneOS”. Provider choice is the same as on other devices: start with the VPN comparison and, if needed, what a VPN does and does not do. Short summary:

  • VPN hides your traffic from your provider
  • VPN shifts trust to the VPN provider
  • Mullvad is the most privacy-friendly choice (no-log, only a random account number, no email address, payable with cash or Monero)

Worth knowing here: Android’s always-on VPN and kill switch work per profile. If the VPN app isn’t running, the phone can block internet for that profile.

Settings → Network & internet → VPN → [your VPN] (gear icon) → Always-on VPN + Block connections without VPN

→ Enable the kill switch if you use a VPN. But do not treat a VPN as a required GrapheneOS setting.


Apps that fit well with a hardened GrapheneOS setup:

Browser

Vanadium — GrapheneOS’s default browser. Hardened Chromium, no telemetry, sandboxed.

Tor Browser — via Guardian Project repo on F-Droid. For anonymous browsing.

Communication

Molly — hardened Signal fork. On-device database encryption, RAM wipe on lock. On hold for new users since 19 October 2026: its latest release (31 July) is months behind Signal, so use the Signal app for now.

Element — Matrix client for decentralised chat.

Passwords

KeePassDX — local password manager. No cloud, no sync unless you set it up yourself.

DNS and Tor

Orbot — Tor proxy. Route specific apps through Tor network.

App store

F-Droid — open-source app store. See the F-Droid guide.

Obtainium — get apps directly from their release pages, such as GitHub. Useful addition to F-Droid for apps not in a repo.


11. Checklist — summary

Copy this as a working list:

Access and lock

  • PIN 6+ digits (or password)
  • Auto-lock set to Immediately
  • USB set to Charging-only when locked, or disabled entirely
  • Lock screen notifications disabled

Network

  • Private DNS configured (Quad9; off if you use a VPN)
  • Per-app network access reviewed
  • Bluetooth and NFC off when not in use
  • VPN kill switch on (if using VPN)

Privacy

  • Location permissions reviewed per app
  • Camera/microphone permissions minimal
  • Sensor permissions revoked where not needed
  • Notification history off

Security

  • Auto-reboot on (default 18h, lower if needed)
  • MTE enabled on Pixel 8+ (optional)
  • Unknown sources only for F-Droid/Obtainium

How far should you go?

That depends on your situation. A useful rule of thumb:

Basic privacy: Do the USB, DNS, PIN and per-app network settings. For most users that covers the biggest risks.

Advanced: Add per-app sensor permissions, auto-reboot, VPN with kill switch, and Tor.

Maximum: Everything above plus: BFU-only usage (power off when not using), profiles for isolation, no sandboxed Google Play.

There’s no wrong choice — every step makes it harder. Do what’s sustainable for daily use, and build from there.


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