Tails OS review — the amnesic operating system
Tails is an operating system you run from a USB stick that sends your internet traffic through Tor and leaves no trace on the computer: everything disappears when you shut down, except what you chose to keep on the stick.

Tails OS review
Tails is an operating system you run from a USB stick that sends your internet traffic through Tor and leaves no trace on the computer: everything disappears when you shut down, except what you chose to keep on the stick.
Who is this for? Journalists, whistleblowers and activists who must leave no trace on a specific computer. Not suitable for daily use — Tails is a tool for specific situations, not an everyday operating system.
It leaves no browsing history, files or session information on the computer you use it on. It does not make you invisible: this review also covers what Tails does not hide.
What Tails does
Amnesic: Tails saves nothing by default. Every time you boot you start with a clean slate. Files, settings and browsing history disappear on shutdown. Optionally you can set up “Persistent Storage” for specific files — but that is a conscious choice, not a default.
Tor for all traffic: Every internet connection from Tails goes through the Tor network, also for software you install yourself; Tails is built with a firewall that stops anything else reaching the internet. Websites and services you visit see a Tor exit address, not yours. The deliberate exception is the Unsafe Browser, which Tails says to use only for signing in to a captive portal (hotel or café Wi-Fi) or for trusted pages on the local network: it does not use Tor, so sites see your real IP address. Close it as soon as you are signed in.
Runs on most 64-bit PCs: Nothing to install on the computer. Boot from the USB drive and Tails runs from memory, separately from the system installed there. Tails says it works on most PCs under 10 years old, but Nvidia and AMD Radeon graphics cards often don’t work. It needs a 64-bit x86 processor: Macs with Apple silicon (M1, M2 and later), phones, Raspberry Pi and other ARM devices are not supported, and Tails says it knows of no Mac that both works well in Tails and runs the latest macOS.
Specifications
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Base | Debian 13 (Trixie) since Tails 7.0 (September 2025), GNOME desktop |
| Routing | Tor for all internet traffic (except the Unsafe Browser and the local network) |
| Storage | Nothing on the computer’s hard disk; everything in RAM |
| Persistent Storage | Optional: encrypted on the USB stick, not hidden |
| Built-in tools | Tor Browser, Thunderbird, Secrets, OnionShare, Metadata Cleaner, LibreOffice |
| Hardware requirement | 64-bit x86 (no Apple silicon, no ARM), 3 GB RAM to work smoothly |
| USB size | Minimum 8 GB |
| Price | Free |
Built-in tools
Tails contains a selection of pre-configured privacy tools:
- Tor Browser: Preconfigured; the security level sets how much JavaScript runs (Safest turns it off completely)
- Thunderbird with built-in OpenPGP: Email with encryption
- Secrets password manager: Password management inside Tails itself, with optional persistence
- OnionShare: Share files, websites and chat rooms over Tor
- Metadata Cleaner (mat2): Remove metadata from files (documents, images)
- Electrum Bitcoin Wallet: Bitcoin wallet without installation

Tails 7.1 (October 2025) with Tor Browser open, the default way to browse in Tails. Screenshot: Sora Célestinia, Wikimedia Commons (GPL).
Who makes Tails (as of November 2026)
Tails is made by the Tor Project, the nonprofit that also develops Tor and Tor Browser. The two merged their operations in September 2024: Tails had outgrown its own structure and asked the Tor Project to take it in (Tor Project blog, 26 September 2024). The Tor Project’s people page now lists a Tails team and developers among its staff. The work is paid for by donations from individuals and organisations; Tails names Mozilla, DuckDuckGo, the Open Technology Fund and Craig Newmark Philanthropies among them (tails.net).
Releases are frequent: from August to October 2026 a new version came out roughly every two weeks, the latest being Tails 7.17 on 11 November 2026, with Tor Browser 16.0.1. The one before it, 7.15.1 on 23 October, was an emergency release that blocks the certificates of eMudhra, a certificate authority whose intermediate certificates were compromised, in Tor Browser (15.0.26) and the rest of the system; Tails was not aware of the flaw being used (Tails 7.15.1).
Persistent Storage — when to use, when not
By default everything disappears. If you want to keep certain files (PGP keys, documents, Tor Browser bookmarks), you can activate Persistent Storage. This is an encrypted partition on the USB drive itself. Only the features Tails lists can be kept: Tor Browser preferences, for example, are not among them.
Use Persistent Storage for:
- PGP keys
- Documents you need in every session
- Thunderbird email account configuration
Do NOT use Persistent Storage for:
- Files you want to delete after a session — those belong in the non-persistent environment
- Anything that would harm you if someone got hold of the stick and its passphrase
What it does not do: Persistent Storage is not hidden. Anyone holding the stick can tell it exists, and Tails warns you could be forced or tricked into giving up the passphrase. Deleting is not reliable on a USB stick: Tails removed its file-wiping tools in version 6.0 for that reason, and says deleting the Persistent Storage might not stop a strong attacker from recovering files, especially with a weak passphrase. Its contents can also link your activities together, so Tails suggests a separate stick per activity if that worries you. And in an emergency you can shut down by pulling the stick, but that risks breaking the Persistent Storage.
Who is Tails for?
Journalists and sources: Tails names journalists and their sources among its users. SecureDrop, the submission system used by news organisations, runs its journalist workstations on Tails.
Whistleblowers: SecureDrop tells sources to use Tor Browser or Tails, and warns against using an employer’s hardware or network, or their home internet connection. So: Tails on a computer and a network not linked to you.
Activists in risk areas: Accessing censored information via Tor without leaving traces on a shared computer. Where connecting to Tor is blocked or dangerous, Tails points to Tor bridges.
Working on someone else’s computer: Tails runs separately from the installed system, so a virus on that computer doesn’t reach it. It cannot protect against altered hardware or firmware, though, and Tails says hardware alterations are more likely on public computers such as those in internet cafés and libraries. See below.
What Tails does NOT protect against
Physical observation: If someone is looking over your shoulder, or a camera is, Tails doesn’t help.
Hardware and firmware attacks: Tails says it can run safely on a computer with a virus, but no operating system protects against altered hardware (such as a hardware keylogger) or a compromised BIOS or firmware. Tails says firmware attacks have been demonstrated but knows of no actual use against its users. Prefer hardware you trust; where you can’t be sure, Tails suggests the screen keyboard or pasting saved passwords, because a keylogger records what you type.
An infected computer during install: Your Tails might be corrupted if you install it from a compromised system. Tails says to install from a computer you trust, not to plug the stick into a running system, and not to use it to move files to or from another system.
A computer taken while Tails is running: Someone with physical access can then read data from memory. Shutting down, normally or by pulling the stick, erases the memory.
Identity mistakes: If you log in to an account linked to your identity (Gmail, Facebook) while running Tails, you have identified yourself despite Tor. Files you share can give you away through their metadata (location, author, device), so clean them first. Doing several things in one session lets them be linked: restart Tails between activities.
Being seen to use Tor, and Tor’s own limits: Tails does not make you look like an ordinary internet user. Your internet provider and local network can see that you connect to Tor, though not which sites you visit; a Tor bridge hides that connection. Sites can see you come from Tor, because the list of exit nodes is public, and many block it or ask for a CAPTCHA. An exit node can read unencrypted traffic and pretend to be the site you want, so use HTTPS and take browser warnings seriously. A powerful adversary watching both ends of your connection might identify you from its timing; Tails says no network for fast connections protects fully against this, and that it knows of no actual use against Tor users (Tails on Tor’s limits).
Running an outdated version: Tails ships regular security updates, occasionally as emergency releases. A 2026 example: Tails 7.10.1 (5 August 2026) was an emergency release for, among others, CVE-2026-64560, a Linux kernel flaw that could let Tor Browser in Tails gain administrator rights. Tails’ own words: a malicious website that managed to exploit it “might take full control of your Tails and deanonymize you”; the attack is “very unlikely but could be performed by a strong attacker, such as a government or a hacking firm”, and Tails was not aware of it being used in practice (Tails 7.10.1). Tails offers each new release as an automatic upgrade when you connect (from Tails 7.0 or later); if that fails, you do a manual upgrade from tails.net. The practical lesson: install upgrades when Tails offers them, not later.
Comparison with other approaches
| Tails | Whonix | GrapheneOS | VPN | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traceless | Yes (amnesic) | Only in Live Mode | No | No |
| Tor routing | Full | Full | Optional (app) | No |
| Portable | Yes (USB) | No (VM) | Yes (phone) | Yes |
| Daily use (our view) | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Difficulty (our view) | Low-medium | High | Medium | Low |
Pros and cons
Pros
- Amnesic by default — no browsing history, no files, no session data survive a reboot
- All internet traffic routes through Tor, also for software you add (the Unsafe Browser, for captive portals, is the exception)
- Runs from USB on most 64-bit PCs — no installation, no modification of the host machine
- Pre-configured privacy tools built in: Tor Browser, Thunderbird, Secrets, OnionShare, Metadata Cleaner
- Made by the Tor Project, with a new release roughly every two weeks
- Persistent Storage is opt-in and encrypted — sensitive data stays only if you choose to keep it
Cons
- Not suitable for daily use — everything via Tor is slow and restricts many sites
- No Apple silicon Macs or ARM devices — you need a 64-bit x86 PC
- Altered hardware and compromised firmware (keylogger, BIOS) undermine Tails: prefer hardware you trust
- Logging into identity-linked accounts (Gmail, Facebook) defeats Tor anonymity regardless of OS
- Tails does not hide that you use Tor: your provider sees it (unless you use a bridge) and so do the sites you visit
- Tor exit nodes can read unencrypted traffic: Tor hides your location, it does not encrypt the last hop, so use HTTPS
Conclusion
Tails is the right tool for specific situations: sensitive communication, source protection, accessing censored information without trace. It is not a daily operating system — for that it is too restrictive and too slow (everything via Tor).
Those wanting a privacy-friendly system for daily use look at GrapheneOS (phone) or Fedora/Linux Mint (desktop).
Getting started
1. Download and install Tails on a USB drive
Go to tails.net on a computer you trust and follow the official install guide for your operating system. The guide includes a step that verifies the download in your browser; don’t skip it. It catches a bad mirror or a broken download, but by Tails’ own account not a compromised computer or browser, a compromised website, or a lookalike site. You need a USB drive of at least 8 GB, and everything on it is erased. Already have Tails? Upgrade instead: installing over it loses your Persistent Storage.
2. Boot from the USB drive
Shut down the computer, plug in the stick, switch on and immediately press the Boot Menu key several times, then choose the USB stick. The key differs per manufacturer, often F12 or Esc; Tails lists them, along with a route from Windows. Tails runs from memory and writes nothing to the computer’s hard drive.
3. Optional: set up Persistent Storage
If you want to keep PGP keys, documents or Tor Browser bookmarks between sessions, choose Apps ▸ Tails ▸ Persistent Storage, set a passphrase (Tails recommends 5 to 7 random words; it cannot be recovered if you forget it) and turn on what you want to keep. This is an encrypted partition on the USB drive itself. Each time you start Tails you choose whether to unlock it, in the Welcome Screen.
Next step
Chosen Tails?
- PGP practical guide — encrypted communication from Tails using Thunderbird and OpenPGP
Similar options
- Whonix review — persistent Tor workspace as an alternative for long-term sensitive work
Want to go further?
- Journalist and activist profile — when Tails is proportionate