VeraCrypt: encrypted storage in practice
For most people, disk encryption is already built into the operating system: BitLocker on Windows, FileVault on macOS, LUKS on Linux. That approach protects the whole drive if someone gains physical access to your device — and it is enough for most readers.

VeraCrypt: encrypted storage in practice
For most people, disk encryption is already built into the operating system: BitLocker on Windows, FileVault on macOS, LUKS on Linux. That approach protects the whole drive if someone gains physical access to your device — and it is enough for most readers.
VeraCrypt fills a different gap. It creates encrypted containers — individual files that act as an encrypted vault — and can encrypt external drives and USB sticks in a way that works across platforms. This guide helps you decide whether VeraCrypt adds something for you, and how to set it up responsibly if it does.
When VeraCrypt makes sense
VeraCrypt is the right choice if:
- you want to store sensitive documents that must also be accessible on both Windows and macOS machines (BitLocker and FileVault do not work cross-platform for containers)
- you are encrypting an external drive or USB stick that you carry to other locations or travel with
- you want a clearly bounded vault for one category of files — source material, client files, financial documents — separate from the rest of your drive
- you need hidden volumes (see the dedicated section below)
VeraCrypt is overkill or the wrong tool if:
- your main goal is protecting your laptop if it is stolen — BitLocker, FileVault, or LUKS is the better route for that, because those protect everything including the running system
- you only want to encrypt cloud storage — Proton Drive or similar services handle that more simply
- you do not yet have basic security in place — encryption protects files at rest, not an active system that is already compromised
The baseline: make sure full-disk encryption of the system itself is enabled. VeraCrypt is a complement, not a replacement.
Containers versus full-disk encryption
VeraCrypt offers two approaches. The choice is usually straightforward.
Encrypted container (recommended for most readers)
A container is a file on your drive — say archive.hc. VeraCrypt treats that file as a drive you can mount, put files into, and then unmount again. Everything inside the mounted container is encrypted automatically. Once unmounted, the contents are inaccessible without the password.
Advantages:
- easy to back up: copy the container file like any other file
- works alongside the OS’s own disk encryption
- easy to move between machines and platforms
Disadvantage: the container has a fixed size you set at creation time. If you need more space later, you create a new container.
Full-disk or partition encryption
VeraCrypt can also encrypt a complete external drive or USB stick (Create Volume → “Encrypt a non-system partition/drive”). This is useful when you want to protect an external drive you travel with and where you are not working with separate file categories. Note: the drive is formatted and everything on it is erased; keep Quick Format off (see step 11 below). Only Windows can encrypt a partition with existing files in place (“Encrypt partition in place”, NTFS only); on macOS and Linux, copy your files off first.
VeraCrypt’s documentation advises against keeping VeraCrypt volumes on devices with wear-levelling, which can include SSDs and USB sticks (the manufacturer can tell you): an old copy of the volume header can survive there, so after a password change the old password may still open the volume. A container on a journaling file system such as NTFS or Ext3 has a similar risk, because an old copy can stay in the free space. If that matters to you, create a new volume rather than changing the password.
VeraCrypt can also encrypt the system drive, but only on Windows (10 version 1809 or later and 11, x64, not ARM64): not on macOS or Linux. It requires a VeraCrypt Rescue Disk (a USB stick on modern EFI computers) that you create during setup. That disk can repair the boot loader and restore a damaged header, but you still need the password. VeraCrypt says to destroy it and make a new one whenever you change the password, because the old disk can bring the old password back, and it asks for a new one after boot loader certificate changes. Install VeraCrypt updates before you prepare a Windows feature update. For most users BitLocker is the simpler route; VeraCrypt system encryption is relevant if you have specific concerns about BitLocker’s closed-source implementation.
Choose containers unless you have a specific reason for full-disk encryption. Containers are simpler to manage and back up.
Creating a container
These steps were checked against VeraCrypt 1.26.31 (November 2026) on Windows, macOS and Linux. The labels are VeraCrypt’s own; the wizard is the same on all three, with small differences noted below.
- Download VeraCrypt from the official site or the signed releases on GitHub, and install it. (The project’s site moved from
veracrypt.frtoveracrypt.io/veracrypt.jp; the old address redirects.)- Check the download before you install it. Each download has a PGP signature. Get VeraCrypt’s key and check that its fingerprint is
5069 A233 D55A 0EEB 174A 5FC3 821A CD02 680D 16DE; if it isn’t, don’t install. VeraCrypt’s Digital Signatures page explains the check (Gpg4win on Windows). A warning from gpg that the key isn’t certified is normal once the fingerprint matches. - macOS (12 or later): VeraCrypt needs a FUSE layer. Install FUSE-T and pick the “FUSE-T compatible version” of VeraCrypt (VeraCrypt recommends it for Macs with Apple silicon), or install macFUSE and the regular version.
- Linux: VeraCrypt offers packages for Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora, CentOS and openSUSE, plus an AppImage and generic installers.
- Check the download before you install it. Each download has a PGP signature. Get VeraCrypt’s key and check that its fingerprint is
- Open VeraCrypt and click Create Volume.
- Choose Create an encrypted file container → Next.
- Leave Standard VeraCrypt volume selected → Next.
- Click Select File…, choose a folder and type a new filename, for example
archive.hc(.hcis the extension VeraCrypt itself uses). Don’t pick an existing file: VeraCrypt overwrites it with the new container. Click Save → Next. - Leave the defaults on Encryption Options (AES, with SHA-512 for the key derivation) → Next. AES is sufficient for all normal use. VeraCrypt’s documentation recommends Argon2id for new non-system volumes and you can pick it here, but it only exists since 1.26.29, so older versions can’t open such a volume. For a container you move between machines, the default is the safer choice.
- Set the size → Next. Think this through: a container can’t easily be enlarged later (see below).
- Type a strong password twice (20 characters or more; VeraCrypt warns you below that) → Next. Store it in your password manager — see Which password manager should you choose?. Leave Use keyfiles and Use PIM unchecked unless you know you need them.
- For a container larger than 4 GiB the wizard asks Large Files: whether you will store files larger than 4 GiB. Answer as needed → Next.
- Choose the Filesystem. If the container must work on both Windows and macOS, pick exFAT: VeraCrypt’s own default is FAT for small containers (no files over 4 GiB), and after a “Yes” on Large Files it’s exFAT on Windows but Mac OS Extended on a Mac or Ext3 on Linux, which the other systems can’t fully use. On Linux, exFAT is only listed if
mkfs.exfatis installed. On macOS and Linux, a Cross-Platform Support screen follows for any filesystem other than FAT: choose I will mount the volume on other platforms → Next. - Leave the format on Full Format (Windows) or Quick Format unticked (macOS, Linux). Quick Format, and on Windows Fast Create and Dynamic, are faster, but someone may be able to tell how much data the container holds. Move your mouse as randomly as possible inside the wizard window. VeraCrypt mixes these movements into the randomness for the keys; the bar shows how much it has collected. Then click Format.
- On Windows, a message says the volume has been successfully created: click OK. On the Volume Created screen, click Exit to close the wizard.
Using the container:
- In the main VeraCrypt window, select a free drive letter (Windows) or a free slot (macOS and Linux; VeraCrypt creates the mount point itself, on Linux under
/media/veracrypt1and so on). - Click Select File… and choose the container.
- Click Mount, enter the volume password and click OK. On macOS and Linux, VeraCrypt may then ask for your own user or administrator password (“Administrator privileges required”), which is a different password from the volume’s.
- The container now appears as a normal drive. Work with your files.
- When you are done, select the volume in the list and click Unmount. Older guides and versions say “Dismount”; current versions call it Unmount. Always unmount before you copy, move, back up or sync the container file.
VeraCrypt also has a Dutch interface. On Windows, you can change it under Settings → Language…; on Linux, VeraCrypt follows the system language, and you can change it under Settings → Preferences…, Language tab.
Hidden volumes
VeraCrypt supports a specific feature: a container with two passwords. Password A opens the outer volume with a set of ordinary files. Password B opens the hidden volume with the actual sensitive files. According to VeraCrypt’s documentation, it should be impossible to prove that a hidden volume exists, because the free space in every VeraCrypt volume is filled with random data and the hidden volume can’t be told apart from it. That only holds if you follow VeraCrypt’s own precautions (below).
This is relevant in two situations:
- you store sensitive source material in a jurisdiction where you can be legally compelled to hand over your password
- you store information where plausible deniability has real legal or personal value
For most readers, hidden volumes are not necessary. A normal strong password is sufficient for most threat models. Consider hidden volumes only if you are thinking concretely about compelled decryption.
What it doesn’t do. VeraCrypt says there is practically no plausible explanation for a file full of random data, so a container gets its deniability only from the hidden volume inside it, not from looking like something else. It also won’t stop pressure: Tails’ documentation warns that deniable encryption might not protect you if you are forced to reveal the volume, and someone who knows about this feature may not believe the outer volume is all there is (our reasoning).
Creating one: Create Volume → Create an encrypted file container → Hidden VeraCrypt volume (on Windows, then Normal mode). The wizard first creates the outer volume (location, encryption, size, password), then offers Open Outer Volume: copy sensitive-looking files there that you don’t actually need to hide, because they are what you show when forced. Don’t use Quick Format for the outer volume, and on Windows don’t delete files from it first. Only then does it create the hidden volume inside (its own encryption options, size and a different password). VeraCrypt says the hidden password must be substantially different from the outer one; its Windows wizard refuses identical ones.
Precautions from VeraCrypt’s documentation:
- Protect the hidden volume when writing to the outer volume. Writing to the outer volume can overwrite the hidden one. When you mount the outer volume yourself, use Mount Options… (Windows) or Options > (macOS, Linux) in the password dialog, tick Protect hidden volume against damage caused by writing to outer volume and enter the hidden volume’s password too. The tick resets after every mount. VeraCrypt confirms the protection with a message after mounting: no message means no protection. The operating-system precaution below applies then too. When someone forces you to open the outer volume, mount it normally, without the protection.
- Don’t keep several copies over time. Someone who can compare copies of the container from different moments (an older backup, a cloud folder with version history) can see which parts changed, and changes inside the “free space” point to a hidden volume. Back up a hidden volume the way VeraCrypt describes: create a new outer and hidden volume each time (without Quick Format, with a small hidden volume and an outer volume nearly full of files) and copy the files across.
- Not on SSDs, USB sticks or journaling file systems. Wear-levelling can leave old copies of sectors behind; VeraCrypt says not to store hidden volumes on such devices. It also says a container that needs deniability must not sit on a journaling file system such as NTFS or Ext3: use a VeraCrypt partition or drive, or a non-journaling file system such as FAT32. Defragmenting can leave copies too.
- Mind the operating system. While a hidden volume is mounted, the system and apps can write file names and temporary files to the unencrypted system drive. VeraCrypt’s requirement is a hidden operating system or a live system on Windows and a live system on Linux, and it advises against hidden volumes on macOS unless you can rule out such writes. A password manager holding the hidden password also gives it away if you can be forced to open the manager (our reasoning).
Use a current VeraCrypt release for hidden volumes. Versions 1.26.6 through 1.26.28 on Windows left zeroed sectors at fixed 128 MiB intervals when creating a hidden volume inside a container file, which can betray the hidden volume (VeraCrypt advisory GHSA-jjcr-75w7-58jp, CVE-2026-54073, fixed in 1.26.29; the contents and the encryption are not affected). If you created a hidden volume in a container file on Windows with one of those versions and rely on its deniability, recreate it with a current release and securely erase the old container.
Operational pitfalls
Forgetting your password means losing your data
VeraCrypt has no recovery option. No backup code, no customer support, no technical workaround. If you forget the password, the files are permanently lost. Store the password in a password manager. Also back up the password manager database itself.
A damaged header can cost you the data too
If a volume’s header is damaged, the volume usually can’t be mounted. Every volume except a system drive has a backup header built in; VeraCrypt falls back on it by itself and tells you to repair the volume under Tools > Restore Volume Header…. For extra safety you can keep an external copy: select the volume, choose Tools > Backup Volume Header…, enter the password and save the file somewhere other than that volume.
- A restored header brings back the old password. Restoring also restores the password and keyfiles that were valid when you made the backup, so after a password change, make a new backup and delete the old one.
- It fits one volume only. Restored onto another volume, it leaves that volume’s data undecryptable.
- It doesn’t replace the password. You still need the password to make or use the backup.
Forensic traces on Windows
If a VeraCrypt container has been mounted on Windows, traces can remain, according to VeraCrypt’s documentation: VeraCrypt’s own history of the last twenty volumes you mounted (unless Never save history is ticked in the main window), Windows registry entries such as “shellbags” that record folder names and access times, and since Windows 8 a system event (Event 98) each time an NTFS-formatted volume is mounted, unless you mount it as a removable medium. The contents are not visible, but the usage is.
This isn’t only about Windows: on any system, while a volume is mounted, the system and apps can write file names and unencrypted temporary files to an unencrypted system drive. VeraCrypt’s answer if you don’t need deniability: encrypt the system drive, or work from a live system.
If this is relevant to your threat model — journalists or activists working in environments where forensic investigation is realistic — consider opening the container from a live OS such as Tails. Tails can open existing VeraCrypt volumes (Apps ▸ Utilities ▸ Unlock VeraCrypt Volumes) but cannot create them; create the volume elsewhere first.
Slow mounting is normal
VeraCrypt intentionally uses slow key derivation (PBKDF2 with high iteration counts, and optionally Argon2id) to make brute-force attacks harder. Mounting can take a moment. This is a design choice, not a bug.
Resizing a container is not straightforward
On Windows, VeraCrypt installs a separate tool, VeraCrypt Expander, that can enlarge a container formatted with NTFS. It does not work for exFAT or FAT containers, and must not be used on an outer volume that contains a hidden volume (that destroys the hidden volume). On macOS and Linux, and for exFAT containers: create a new, larger container, copy the contents across, and delete the old one. Plan the size generously when you create it.
Backing up encrypted containers
A container file behaves like any other file: unmount it, copy it to a backup location and the backup is done. The encryption comes with it. A mounted container can still change, so a copy or sync made while it’s mounted may not be usable (our reasoning; VeraCrypt’s documentation doesn’t cover this).
Key points:
- Test your backup. Verify that you can mount the container on another machine using the same password. An untested backup is not a backup.
- A copy keeps the old keys. A copied container has the same master key as the original. If you later change the password, older copies still open with the old password. If your password may have leaked, VeraCrypt advises creating a new container and moving the files, not just changing the password.
- Use a copy as a backup, not as a second working volume. If a copy and the original start to hold different data, they share one key set, which VeraCrypt says can aid cryptanalysis. If someone can repeatedly reach your backup, VeraCrypt’s method is a new backup volume each time, with the files copied across.
- Keep the password separate from the container. A backup of the container and the password on the same external drive effectively cancels out the encryption.
- Keep the backup current. An outdated container backup is missing everything added since. Sync regularly, or set a backup schedule.
For hidden volumes, plain copies over time are a risk (see above). See the Backup implementation guide for a broader approach to backups.
Already using VeraCrypt or TrueCrypt?
- Update to the current release (1.26.31 as of 6 November 2026; Downloads page or your package source). Existing VeraCrypt containers keep working, apart from the old formats below.
- TrueCrypt volumes no longer open since VeraCrypt 1.26, nor do volumes that use the old RIPEMD-160 hash or the GOST89 cipher. If an old volume won’t mount, VeraCrypt 1.25.9 shows under Volume Properties whether one of these is the cause. VeraCrypt’s conversion guide: convert TrueCrypt volumes (6.x and 7.x) and change RIPEMD-160 with 1.25.9 (on Windows also with the VCPassChanger tool); a GOST89 volume has to be recreated. Use 1.25.9 only for this, then return to the current release. After converting a TrueCrypt container, rename
.tcto.hc. - Hidden volumes from VeraCrypt 1.17 or earlier: VeraCrypt says to recreate both the outer and hidden volume if you rely on deniability. For Windows containers with a hidden volume made with 1.26.6 to 1.26.28, see the hidden-volume section above.
Next step
Encryption as part of a broader approach
- Backup implementation guide — how to structure backups so encrypted files are not lost
- Secure laptop guide — VeraCrypt as part of a secure desktop setup
Evaluate VeraCrypt as a product
- VeraCrypt review — if you want to compare technical properties and alternatives
Use this in context
- Profile: journalist and activist — VeraCrypt for sensitive source material and field work
- Profile: lawyer, notary or politician — encrypted storage for professional confidentiality and client files