Chat Control and encryption laws: where the EU and UK stand
As of 8 November 2026, no EU law in force makes messengers scan end-to-end encrypted chats, but the permanent EU child-safety law is still being negotiated. In the UK, the fight is over iCloud encryption.

Chat Control and encryption laws: where the EU and UK stand
As of 8 November 2026, no EU law in force makes messengers scan end-to-end encrypted chats, but the permanent EU child-safety law is still being negotiated. In the UK, the fight is over iCloud encryption.
Who this guide is for
Readers who use Signal, WhatsApp, iMessage or encrypted email and keep seeing headlines about “Chat Control” or government backdoors. It explains what is actually in force, what is still open, and whether anything changes for you today. It is written for readers in the Netherlands and the EU, with the UK covered because it affects Apple users there.
What this guide does not solve
- It is not legal advice, and it does not predict how the negotiations end.
- It does not cover every country. Other governments have their own proposals.
- It says nothing about which app to pick. See the Signal guide for that.
- It is a snapshot. Everything below was checked again on 8 November 2026 (first written 30 September 2026). This area changes quickly, so check the date before you rely on it.
What “Chat Control” is
“Chat Control” is the name critics give to a European Commission proposal from May 2022 for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse, the CSA Regulation. It would oblige online services to assess and reduce the risk of abuse on their platforms, create an EU Centre to support enforcement, and in its original form let authorities order services to detect abuse material in private messages.
The controversy is about that last part. A service cannot look inside a properly end-to-end encrypted chat without either reading messages on your device before they are encrypted or weakening the encryption itself. That is why privacy groups oppose detection orders that cover encrypted chats, while supporters point to the need to protect children from abuse. The Dutch government uses the same reasoning: it says detection in end-to-end encrypted environments can in practice only be done with client-side scanning.
What has actually happened
Every row below is from an official source (Parliament’s procedure file and press releases, Council documents, the EU’s Official Journal and Dutch government answers to MPs), except where marked.
| Date | What happened |
|---|---|
| 11 May 2022 | The Commission proposes the CSA Regulation |
| 14 Nov 2023 | Parliament’s civil liberties committee adopts its position. It excludes end-to-end encrypted communication from detection orders and allows orders only as a last resort, time-limited and aimed at users suspected of a link to abuse material |
| 26 Nov 2025 | EU governments’ ambassadors agree a (partial) negotiating mandate. In the Council’s text the detection orders are deleted, and the old rules for voluntary detection are kept going |
| 19 Dec 2025 | The Commission proposes extending the old temporary rules by two years, to 3 April 2028 |
| 26 Mar 2026 | Parliament rejects the extension proposal (228 for, 311 against, 92 abstaining), after talks with the Council failed to reach an agreement |
| 3 Apr 2026 | The old temporary rules, which let providers voluntarily scan for abuse material, expire |
| 9 Jul 2026 | At second reading, Parliament amends the Council’s text so that it excludes communications “to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied” |
| 24 Jul 2026 | Regulation (EU) 2026/1881 is adopted (in force since 31 July 2026): a temporary regime, running until 3 April 2028, that again lets providers voluntarily detect abuse material and does not apply to end-to-end encrypted communication |
| 29 Sep 2026 | A sixth negotiating round on the permanent law takes place, dedicated to detection obligations and “own-initiative searches”. Neither the Council nor Parliament has published an outcome (checked 8 November 2026). Patrick Breyer, a former MEP who campaigns against Chat Control, reported that there was no deal on scanning private chats, a provisional deal on scanning publicly accessible content for known abuse material, and another round expected in November. His site now lists 8 December 2026 for that round |
Two things matter here. The temporary regulation is voluntary and excludes end-to-end encryption, so it does not require anyone to scan your Signal chats. And the permanent law is where the real decision sits: Parliament’s position excludes encrypted chats from detection orders and the Council’s deletes the orders, but the 29 September round was about detection obligations and own-initiative searches, and the temporary regulation itself says the negotiations on the permanent law “are still ongoing”. In July 2026 Parliament wrote that most aspects of the permanent law had been agreed in the first half of 2026, “leaving certain aspects still to be discussed”, without saying which. Parliament’s procedure file still shows the law at first reading.
The Dutch position: in answers to MPs on 18 September 2026, the justice minister wrote that the Netherlands will not support mandatory detection in everyone’s private communication or anything that makes end-to-end encryption impossible.
What it means for you today
- End-to-end encrypted messengers (Signal, WhatsApp, iMessage and similar): nothing changes today. Regulation 2026/1881 says it “does not apply to interpersonal communications to which end-to-end encryption is, has been or will be applied”, and its recitals say that “nothing in this Regulation should therefore be interpreted as prohibiting or weakening end-to-end encryption”.
- Messaging and webmail services that are not end-to-end encrypted: the temporary regulation names “webmail and messaging services” (audio is excluded), so providers may scan voluntarily, as they could before. That is not new, but it is a reminder that “private” and “encrypted end to end” are different things. The secure email guide explains the difference for email.
- The permanent law: unsettled. A final text that reached into encrypted chats would be a real change. Nothing in the sources I read says that is the current outcome.
The UK: a different fight
The UK dispute is not about messaging apps. It is about Apple’s iCloud backup encryption.
What Apple itself says, on its support page published 23 September 2025:
- UK users who had not already turned on Advanced Data Protection (ADP) can no longer do so.
- Without ADP, ten iCloud categories (including iCloud Backup, Drive, Photos and Notes) use Standard Data Protection, and UK users “will not have a choice to benefit from end-to-end encryption for these categories”.
- Unaffected: the 15 iCloud categories that are end-to-end encrypted by default, such as Keychain and Health, and iMessage and FaceTime, which “remain end-to-end encrypted globally, including in the UK”.
- ADP “continues to be available everywhere else in the world”.
- Apple says it has “never built a backdoor or master key” and never will.
What the Investigatory Powers Tribunal itself publishes: Apple has brought a claim about the Home Secretary’s powers to issue “technical capability notices” under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (ruling of 7 April 2025, which allowed the bare details of the case to be made public), and the tribunal listed a hearing in Apple’s case and a related Privacy International and Liberty case for 17 September 2026. The government’s policy is to neither confirm nor deny individual notices, so whether Apple received one rests on press reports. As of 8 November 2026 the tribunal has published no ruling on whether such a notice is lawful. The iPhone privacy settings guide covers what ADP does for readers outside the UK.
What to do
- Keep using end-to-end encrypted messengers and keep them updated. That is already the practical default.
- Check which of your services are actually end-to-end encrypted, rather than assuming. “Encrypted” on a product page can mean only encrypted in transit.
- UK Apple users: check whether ADP is on for your account; if it is, Apple’s page says you will be given time to turn it off rather than it being switched off for you. If you want end-to-end protection for those categories, that is a question about where else you store them.
- Everyone else: there is nothing to change. Do not switch apps because of a headline.
Signals to watch
- The permanent EU regulation: whether the final text applies any detection duty to end-to-end encrypted services. The CSA Regulation was not on the agenda of the 1 and 2 October 2026 Justice and Home Affairs Council. Breyer’s site lists the next negotiating round for 8 December 2026; a Council or Parliament press release is the source to wait for. The Dutch government has told MPs it will inform them in time before important votes.
- The UK tribunal: whether it ever rules on the lawfulness of the notice, and whether any other provider gets one.
- Your provider’s response: whether the messaging and cloud services you use change what they offer in the EU or the UK. A provider’s own announcement is the source to trust, not a headline about it.
When this is overkill
If you only want to know whether your chats are safe today, the short answer above is enough. The timeline is for readers who want to follow the story or explain it to someone else.
Stopping point
You are done when you know three things: your main messenger is end-to-end encrypted, the temporary EU law excludes end-to-end encryption, and the permanent law is still open. Check back after the next major announcement, not every week.
Next step
Keep your messaging solid
- Signal: good basic setup and beyond
- iPhone privacy settings you can improve today
- Secure email without overkill
Sources: European Parliament Legislative Observatory, procedure 2022/0155(COD); European Parliament press releases of 14 November 2023, 26 March 2026 and 9 July 2026; Council documents 16495/25 (four-column table, 5 December 2025) and 13051/26 (29 September 2026); Regulation (EU) 2026/1881 (Official Journal, 28 July 2026); Dutch government answers to questions from MP Kathmann (18 September 2026) and Kamerstuk 32317 no. 1039 (29 September 2026); Apple Support, “Apple can no longer offer Advanced Data Protection in the United Kingdom to new users” (23 September 2025); Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Apple Inc v Secretary of State for the Home Department (7 April 2025) and its hearings list; Patrick Breyer, “Chat Control 2.0 Trilogue Update: No mass scanning deal for now” (30 September 2026) and his Chat Control page. Checked 2026-11-08; Parliament press releases 2026-11-09.